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KILLING THE PATIENT TO CURE THE DISEASE:
MEDICARE’S JURISDICTIONAL BAR DOES NOT APPLY TO
BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Samuel R. Maizel∗
Michael B. Potere∗∗
ABSTRACT
Sections 405(g) and 405(h) of the Social Security Act require exhaustion of
administrative remedies prior to judicial review for any claims brought under
the Medicare Act. Generally, these claims arise when the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services decides that a hospital owes the government for prior
overpayment. The appeal of such decisions can take years, potentially forcing
hospitals to close due to a lack of continued Medicare payments. As such,
filing for bankruptcy protection quickly becomes one of the hospital's primary
avenues for survival. Historically, however, some bankruptcy courts have
looked to the legislative context of § 405(h) and determined that bankruptcy
courts lack jurisdiction over Medicare claims prior to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This Article argues that such an interpretation is
incorrect because the plain language of § 405(h) renders it inapplicable to a
federal bankruptcy court's jurisdictional grant, and is also contrary to the
Bankruptcy Code's purpose.
INTRODUCTION
Acute care hospitals and other providers of goods and services to Medicare
beneficiaries face a very difficult situation. Many of the patients treated by
hospitals, the supplies provided to patients in hospitals, and numerous other
goods and services, are paid for by the Medicare program.1 However, if the
∗ Samuel R. Maizel is a Partner in Dentons US LLP’s Los Angeles office; he heads the firm’s healthcare
restructuring efforts.
∗∗ Michael B. Potere is an Associate in Dentons US LLP’s Los Angeles office.
The authors are grateful to Lori K. Mihalich-Levi, a Partner in Dentons US LLP’s Washington, D.C.
office, and to Andy Jinnah, an Associate in Dentons US LLP’s Los Angeles office, for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1 The Medicare Program is a federal health insurance program for people age 65 or older, people under
age 65 with certain disabilities, and people of all ages with permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a
kidney transplant. The Medicare Program has three parts: Part A Hospital Insurance covers hospice care, some
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) (or a private contractor
working under contract to CMS), which administers the Medicare Program,
decide the hospital owes the government for a prior overpayment, the
Medicare Program arguably has the right to recoup the amount it believes it is
owed by offsetting it against monies otherwise payable to the hospital. The
hospital has the right to appeal the decision, but in the meantime, its cash flow
could be reduced to a point where it cannot stay in business and provide its
services to Medicare beneficiaries. The right to appeal CMS’s decision is, in
many instances, a meaningless right, because it takes years to proceed through
the Medicare Program’s appeals process. In the meantime, many hospitals risk
being forced to close their doors during this time because they cannot pay their
bills if Medicare does not pay them.
This Article addresses a unique jurisdictional issue that can shorten the
time required to obtain judicial review of a CMS decision by going directly to
federal bankruptcy court. Two bankruptcy court decisions from 2015, In re
Bayou Shores, SNF, LLC2 and In re Nurses’ Registry and Home Health Corp.,3
held that Medicare’s jurisdictional bar under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which would
otherwise prevent judicial review of CMS decisions prior to exhausting
Medicare’s appeals process, does not apply to federal bankruptcy courts. If
bankruptcy courts continue to make this finding consistently (as this Article
argues they should), then filing for bankruptcy would become an important
option available to health care providers and suppliers to resolve disputes with
CMS and the Medicare Program when they would otherwise go out of business
absent the speedy resolution of these disputes. However, bankruptcy courts (as
well as federal district courts and circuit courts of appeal) have debated this
issue for more than thirty years and are not in agreement on the outcome.
This Article concludes that debtors in bankruptcy court are exempt from
42 U.S.C. § 405(h)’s exhaustion requirement because its plain language does
not bar bankruptcy court jurisdiction prior to exhaustion—thus, bankruptcy
courts do not have to wait. However, some language in § 405(h)’s “legislative

home health care, inpatient care in hospitals, and some care in skilled nursing facilities; Part B Medical
Insurance covers physician care and outpatient care among other things; and Part C covers prescription drugs.
CMS (formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration), is a component of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79
Stat. 286 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395kkk-1).
2 525 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014).
3 533 B.R. 590, 593–94 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015).
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history”4 has caused courts to ignore the statute’s plain language in favor of
trying to interpret what Congress meant when it passed § 405(h). This analysis
is flawed; § 405(h)’s plain language should govern its interpretation and
application. Part I of this Article discusses § 405(h)’s
background
and
legislative history. Part II outlines the current state of the Medicare appeals
process, noting the delays that plague the system. Part III discusses the
requirement that the proceedings “arise under” the Medicare Act. Part IV
analyzes the analytical framework in which § 405(h) has been interpreted and
concludes that § 405(h)’s plain language, not its legislative history, should
govern its application.
I. BACKGROUND ON 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) AND ITS ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:
MEDICARE’S JURISDICTIONAL BAR ABSENT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATION
REMEDIES
A. Section 405(h) and Its Legislative History
The Social Security Act requires exhaustion of administrative remedies
prior to judicial review through 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h), and this
requirement specifically applies to the Medicare Act—which itself has been
described by courts as one of the “most completely impenetrable texts within
human experience”5—via 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii (incorporating § 405(h)) and
1395ff(c) (incorporating § 405(g)).6 The relevant provisions state:
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) Judicial Review
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner . . . may
obtain a review of such decision by a civil action. . . . The court shall

4

In 1984, § 405(h) was amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 2663(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. 1162. The language cited to by courts to read beyond § 405(h)’s plain language is
contained in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162. Because
§ 2664(b) is itself legislation, it cannot be “legislative history.” The analysis courts must employ when
considering § 2663 in conjunction with § 2664 is that of statutory construction, and not legislative intent. Be
that as it may, this Article uses the “legislative history” label to refer to arguments based on § 2664(b)
to
mirror the language, however imprecise, used by the courts.
5 Cooper Univ. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
6 See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) (West Supp. 1977) (added in 1974). Generally, the concept of
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party is not entitled to judicial relief unless and
until available administrative remedies have been exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U.S. 50–51 (1938). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in bankruptcy cases.
See, e.g., In re Cottrell, 213 B.R. 33 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (discussing statutory and non-statutory exhaustion).
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have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner . . . with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. . . . The judgment of the court shall be final except that it
shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other
civil actions.
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) Finality of Commissioner’s Decision
The findings and decision of the Commissioner . . . after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such
hearing. No findings of fact or decision . . . shall be reviewed by any
person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided.
No action against the United States, . . . or any officer or employee
thereof shall be brought under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover
on any claim arising under this subchapter.7

Absent a final decision by the applicable administrative body, federal courts
cannot take jurisdiction over a disputed issue arising under the Social Security
or Medicare Acts. The concept underlying this requirement is that a party is
not entitled to federal judicial relief unless and until available administrative
remedies have been exhausted.8 The question then becomes whether such a
jurisdictional limitation applies only to those suits brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1336, or if § 405(h) applies to other federal jurisdictional
grants, including the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional grant in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1334.
Section 405 was enacted in 1939 as part of the Social Security Act.9 At that
time, it barred jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 41.10 Section 41 contained
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h) (2015). In this discussion, we address an instance where the exhaustion
requirement is based on a statute. There are cases, however, where courts have required parties to exhaust their
administrative remedies based on the court’s discretion, rather than a statute. In such cases requiring the
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is generally thought to encourage more economical and less formal
means of dispute resolution, as well as to promote efficiency. See generally Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 755 F.3d 959, 964–66 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing ERISA).
8 See generally Myers, 303 U.S. at 50–51.
9 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (Supp. V 1939); BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 n.11 (6th Cir.
2005). See Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 205(h), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371 (1939) (amendment to Social Security Act
adding jurisdictional bar now found at 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)).
10 In 1939, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) stated:

The findings and decision of the Board after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who
were parties to such hearing. No- findings of fact or decision of the Board shall be reviewed by
any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the
United States, the Board, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 41 of
Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under sections 401–09 of this chapter.
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twenty-eight sub-sections that granted the United States district courts
“original jurisdiction” over various types of claims, including, in sub-section
19, “all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”11 In 1948, when Congress
revised the U.S. Code, it extracted these jurisdictional grants from § 41 and recodified some of them as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1348, 1350 to 1357, 1359,
1397, 2361, 2401, and 2402.12 The re-codification included numerous
substantive changes, such as removing the designation of a married woman as
“disabled” for the purpose of tolling of the statute of limitations for her to
bring a claim against the United States government.13 Although Congress rewrote § 41, it did not correspondingly update § 405(h), which maintained its
reference to § 41 for the next three decades. As such, § 405(h) was applied as
though it referred to all of the jurisdictional grants that previously existed in
§ 41, largely due to the proposition in the 1975 Supreme Court decision
Weinberger v. Salfi that the 1948 re-codification of 28 U.S.C. § 41 “caused no
substantive change in the coverage of [§ 405(h)’s] jurisdictional bar.”14
In 1976, one year after the Weinberger decision, the Office of Law
Revision Counsel15 revised § 405(h) by removing its reference to 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 and replacing it with references to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction) and 1346 (suits against the United States).16 Seemingly (and to at
least one court, “clearly”), these were the only jurisdictional grants the Office

See also BP Care, Inc., 398 F.3d at 515 n.11.
11 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1946), 36 Stat. 1091, 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 41(19) (1934).
12 Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 930–35 (1948); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1348, 1350–1357, 1359, 1397,
2361, 2401, 2402 (1952); see also In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Absent from the recodification was, for example, § 41(4)’s grant of original jurisdiction in the federal district courts for “all suits
arising under any law relating to the slave trade.” 28 U.S.C. § 41(4) (1946).
13 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 41(20) (1946) (“The claims of married women, first accrued during
marriage . . . entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the suit be brought within three years after the
disability has ceased . . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1952) (“The action of any person under legal disability or
beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability
ceases.”).
14 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015) (citing
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756 n.3 (1975) (“The literal wording of this section bars actions under 28
U.S.C. § 41. At the time § 405(h) was enacted, and prior to the 1948 re-codification of Title 28, § 41 contained
all of that title’s grants of jurisdiction to United States district courts, save for several special-purpose
jurisdictional grants of no relevance to the constitutionality of Social Security statutes.”)).
15 The Office of the Law Revision Counsel is part of the United States House of Representatives and
publishes the United States Code. See 2 U.S.C. § 285(b) (2015). The United States Code contains the general
and permanent laws of the United States.
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1346; BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005).
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of Law Revision Counsel believed were relevant to Medicare Act claims.17
And so, after almost three decades, the Social Security Act caught up with and
incorporated the changes in the Code pertaining to federal court jurisdiction.
Eight years later, in 1984, Congress expressly enacted the Law Revision
Counsel’s changes as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (“DRA”).18 As
part of the DRA, Congress enacted a provision entitled, “Effective Dates,”
which stated in sub-section (b) that:
Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle,
the amendments made by section 2663 shall be effective on the date
of the enactment of this Act; but none of such amendments shall be
construed as changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or
interpretation which existed (under the provisions of law involved)
before that date.19

Some courts have found that this provision represents Congress’s caution to
the courts not to interpret § 2663’s “technical corrections” as “substantive
changes” to § 405(h).20 In so doing, however, these courts have ignored
§ 405(h)’s facially limited applicability to §§ 1331 or 1346.21
B. Section 405(h)’s Purpose and Application
Section 405(h) serves two primary purposes. First, its rigorous enforcement
is said to aid in and benefit from the development of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services’s expertise.22 Second, it is intended to prevent
“disgruntled” claimants from bringing actions in federal court instead of
exhausting their remedies with the agency.23

17 Nurses’ Registry, 533 B.R. at 594 (“Clearly the Office of Law Revision Counsel believed that these
grants of jurisdiction were the only ones relevant to SSA or Medicare Act claims.”).
18 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2663(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. 1162 (“Section 205(h) of
such Act is amended by striking out ‘section 24 of the Judicial Code of the United States’ and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘section 1331 or 1346 of title 28, United States Code . . . .’”). Changes to a statute by the Law Revision
Counsel are not binding absent enactment by Congress.
19 Deficit Reduction Act § 2664(b) (emphasis added).
20 E.g., In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
21 See Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 145 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
a jurisdictional bar in a case invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1332); Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas.,
903 F.2d 480, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying a jurisdictional bar in a case invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1332); Total
Renal Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (applying a jurisdictional bar in a case
invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1361).
22 E.g., St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. at 17.
23 United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926–27 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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With these purposes in mind, hundreds of courts, including dozens of
bankruptcy courts, have analyzed the applicability of § 405(h) since the 1980s.
During that time, courts have elaborated on the legal standard for determining
whether § 405(h) applies to bar a court’s jurisdiction. The first step in the
analysis is to determine whether the claim “arises under” the Medicare Act.24 If
it does, the next step—and the question we address herein—is whether the
claim falls within § 405(h)’s jurisdiction: “under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28.”25
As discussed in more detail below, one line of cases looks to § 405(h)’s
legislative context and defines that jurisdictional grant broadly to include all
forms of federal court jurisdiction, including bankruptcy jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1334;26 the other line of cases reasons (correctly, in our view) that
the plain language of § 405(h) only restricts judicial review prior to exhaustion
for claims brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.27
A claim “arises under” the Medicare Act when: (1) the “standing and
substantive basis for the presentation” of the claim is the Medicare Act;28 and
(2) the claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a claim for Medicare benefits.29
In evaluating whether a claim arises under the Medicare Act, courts have
looked beyond whether the claim was allegedly brought under the
Constitution, other federal statutes, or even state law, to find that the claim
nevertheless arose under the Medicare Act because it was inextricably
intertwined with the Medicare Act.30 Courts have also “refused to treat the
remedy sought as dispositive of the ‘arising under’ question.”31 In essence, the
issue as to whether a claim “arises under” the Medicare Act is very broadly
interpreted.32

24 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2015); see also Quinones v. United Health Grp. Inc., No. 14-00497, 2015 WL
3965961, at *4 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice, Inc. v. Burwell, 77 F. Supp.
3d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2015); In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 173 B.R. 238, 244–45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1994).
25 E.g., Bodimetric Health Servs., 903 F.2d at 488.
26 E.g., Nicole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., No. 10-389, 2011 WL 1162052, at *14
n.24 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011).
27 E.g., In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991).
28 Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466
U.S. 602, 615 (1984)).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 1141–42.
31 Id. at 1142.
32 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 14 (2000) (“Claims for money, claims for
other benefits, claims of program eligibility, and claims that contest a sanction or remedy may all similarly rest
upon individual fact-related circumstances, may all similarly dispute agency policy determinations, or may all
similarly involve the application, interpretation, or constitutionality of interrelated regulations or statutory
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If a claim both arises under the Medicare Act and falls within § 405(h)’s
jurisdictional bar, a court may not review the claim unless it has received a
final decision from the Secretary.33 This finality requirement has two elements.
First, it has a non-waivable requirement that the claim has been “presented to”
the Secretary.34 Second, it has a waivable requirement that the Secretary’s
administrative remedies have been “exhausted,” commonly known as the
“exhaustion requirement.”35 Determining whether the exhaustion requirement
can be waived in any case is not “mechanical” and should be “guided by” the
exhaustion requirement’s underlying policies.36 Instead, and after the claim has
been “presented to” the Secretary, courts analyze three factors from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine if the
exhaustion requirement should be waived: (1) whether the claim is “collateral”
to the demand for benefits, (2) whether exhaustion would be “futile,” and
(3) whether the plaintiff would suffer “irreparable harm” if required to navigate
the agency’s review process.37 A claim is “collateral” when it challenges an
agency policy and the outcome of the merits of that challenge does not impact
the plaintiff’s benefits award—in other words, “if [the claim] doesn’t
automatically increase benefits if successful.”38 Whether a claim is “futile”
turns on its futility within the context of the Medicare system—in other words,
whether favorable agency review could actually grant the plaintiff the relief
sought.39 Finally, “irreparable harm” results when any damage caused to the
plaintiff by the delay awaiting final agency review cannot be remedied with
money.40 In addition to the Eldridge factors, courts will weigh the harm to the
government and the purpose of the Medicare Act when determining whether to
waive a plaintiff’s exhaustion requirement.41 For our purposes, however, we
focus on the period before the Eldridge exhaustion review and consider

provisions. There is no reason to distinguish among them in terms of the language or in terms of the purposes
of § 405(h).”).
33 E.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice, Inc. v. Burwell, 77 F. Supp. 3d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2015)
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976)).
34 E.g., id.
35 Id.
36 Id. (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986)).
37 Miller v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-4245, 2015 WL 2257278, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2015) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976); Martin v. Shalala, 63 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir.1995)).
38 Miller, 2015 WL 2257278, at *6.
39 Id. at *7.
40 Id. (quoting Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)).
41 E.g., V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1032 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466
U.S. 936 (1984).
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whether § 405(h) applies to bar a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction prior to
exhaustion in the first place.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF MEDICARE CLAIMS DISPUTES PROCESS AND
APPEALS
A. Steps in the Medicare Appeals Process
There are several ways a hospital can become involved in a Medicare
dispute. First, Medicare could deny a hospital’s claim or a group of claims.
Second, Medicare could review a hospital’s annual cost report and decide the
hospital was overpaid. And third, Medicare could suspend payments due to
concerns about a hospital’s billing practices, including allegations of fraud.
Regarding the first avenue, the Medicare appeals process for a denied
hospital claim contains five distinct steps. Medicare contractors, under the
supervision of CMS, conduct the first two levels of review.42 First, the hospital
could ask the Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”) (also referred to
as a “fiscal intermediary” (“FI”)) that actually denied its claims or declared the
overpayment to “redetermine” its decision. Initial submitted claims are usually
quite rudimentary, but to commence the redetermination the hospital has to
compile documents that support its claim and file the appeal within 120 days of
the denial.43 If that redetermination is denied (the MAC has 60 days to act), the
hospital has 180 days to file for reconsideration to the Qualified Independent
Contractor (“QIC”).44 If this appeal is denied (the QIC has 60 days to decide),
the hospital can appeal to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who operates
under the supervision of the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals
(“OMHA”).45 If the ALJ decides against the hospital, the next level of appeal
is the Medicare Appeals Council of the Departmental Appeals Board
(“DAB”).46 The DAB decision is the “final decision” referenced in § 405(g),

42 Courts have not allowed suits against these private contractors to proceed as a way to avoid the
jurisdictional bar to suing the federal agency (CMS) itself. See, e.g., Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna
Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 487–88 (7th Cir. 1990). This is because Medicare contractors are merely conduits
for payment and have no vested interest in the Medicare funds they administer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk1(a)(4)(A), (B) (2015).
43 42 C.F.R. § 405.942(a) (2015).
44 42 C.F.R. § 405.962(a).
45 42 C.F.R. § 405.1000.
46 42 C.F.R. § 405.1100.
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so that only after the DAB decides can a federal court have jurisdiction over
the matter in dispute.47
Another avenue a hospital may take through the Medicare appeals process
is based on a review of a hospital’s cost report. At the end of a hospital’s fiscal
year, it files a “cost report” that describes the actual claims submitted during
that year. A MAC or FI reviews the cost report and makes an initial
determination of whether the hospital was overpaid or underpaid during the
cost year.48 If the hospital was overpaid, the MAC or FI will issue a notice of
overpayment, and if payment is not forthcoming, may recover the overpayment
through recoupment of outgoing payments. The MAC or FI subsequently
performs a full audit of the cost report and issues a Notice of Program
Reimbursement (“NPR”), which is the MAC’s final determination as to the
alleged overpayment.49 The MAC has seven years to issue the NPR, however,
and thus the process can be lengthy. The hospital may appeal an adverse NPR
to the Provider Reimbursement and Review Board (“PRRB”),50 and it is only
after receiving a PRRB decision that a hospital may obtain judicial review of
an adverse NPR in federal district court.51
Finally, if there are questions about a hospital’s claims against Medicare,
the Medicare Program can institute administrative measures, such as a
prepayment review of claims or a suspension of payments, which may result in
delayed, smaller, or even the absence of payments to the hospital.52 If a
payment suspension is initiated, the hospital can submit a rebuttal that the
CMS or the MAC reviews. A suspension is generally not appealable, but once
a determination of an overpayment is made, the same appeals process for
denied claims (described above) applies.
So, naturally, the question is “how long does all this take?” The answer: it
can be a really long time.53 Why? Because review at the ALJ level is broken.
47 Review by the DAB is discretionary, and if it decides to review the ALJ decision, the ALJ decision
becomes the “final” decision.
48 42 C.F.R. § 413.20.
49 42 C.F.R. § 405.1803.
50 The PRRB reviews costs reports and handles “provider” payment disputes that are not claims related.
MACs also review “claims” including “supplier” claim payment issues. (Suppliers are not providers, so MACs
use a different process for claims payment issues). Providers also use the ALJ process for claims disputes.
51 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a) (2015); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835.
52 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.370–75. As a general rule, suspensions are limited to 180 days, with a possible onetime 180-day extension. However, there are some exceptions that allow longer suspensions.
53 The average processing time for appeals decided by the OMHA in fiscal year 2015 was 547.1 days, a
number that may be underreporting the problem because an increasing number of appeals in 2015 also created

MAIZEL_POTERE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/4/2016 10:33 AM

KILLING THE PATIENT TO CURE THE DISEASE

29

The OMHA is currently staffed to handle approximately 72,000 claims on
appeal in a year. However, as of July 1, 2014, it had over 800,000 claims
pending on appeal and was getting an additional 10,000 to 16,000 claim
appeals per week (while it can only dispose of approximately 1,300 claims per
week).54 The situation is so bad that as of June 2015, Medicare offered to settle
over 300,000 appeals based on inpatient claims for sixty-eight cents on the
dollar.55
B. A Hospital’s Dilemma
As discussed above, a hospital’s appeals process can take a long time. And
once the QIC’s decision is made, CMS can institute recoupment56 against the
hospital’s ongoing payments (and while the ALJ decision is pending).
Although the hospital will be repaid if it later prevails in the appeals process,
this creates a potentially fatal dilemma. On the one hand, the hospital must
exhaust the administrative process before appealing the Medicare Program’s
decision in federal district court. Yet, the delay associated with exhausting the
administrative process could put the hospital out of business by reducing the
hospital’s cash flow to a point where it could not continue to operate pending
the administrative decision. Thus, the hospital’s only viable option may be to
eschew the administrative process by filing for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts,
in turn, have been wrestling with the issue of whether they have jurisdiction
over this type of matter for decades.
III. SECTION 405(h)’S APPLICATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides the statutory basis for bankruptcy
courts’ jurisdiction and expressly makes that jurisdiction “exclusive,”57 courts

a 20–24 week delay in even docketing new requests into OMHA’s case processing system. Adjudication
Timeframes, OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS AND APPEALS, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important_notice_
regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html (last visited December 21, 2015).
54 Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing on Exploring Medicare Appeal Reform
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Healthcare &
Entitlements, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief A.L.J., Office of Medicare Hearings
and Appeals), www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/07/t20140710a.html (last visited on Feb. 13, 2015).
55 Inpatient Hospital Reviews, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:26
PM),
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/monitoring-programs/medicare-ffs-complianceprograms/medical-review/inpatienthospitalreviews.html.
56 Recoupment occurs when Medicare recovers an overpayment by withholding from ongoing payments
to a provider.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2015) (emphasis added).
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analyzing § 405(h) in the bankruptcy context are nevertheless split on whether
its jurisdictional limitation to claims “brought under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28”
also bars judicial review absent exhaustion under the bankruptcy jurisdictional
grant, § 1334. The line of cases finding that bankruptcy cases do not fall under
§ 405(h) primarily rely on § 405(h)’s plain language (which is limited to
§§ 1331 and 1346), as well as § 1334’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts over the debtor’s estate.58 The line of cases holding that
bankruptcy claims do fall within § 405(h)’s jurisdiction bar and require
presentment and exhaustion to the Secretary before seeking judicial review
primarily rely upon § 405(h)’s legislative context, which the courts argue
implicitly cites to every jurisdictional grant contained in the former 28 U.S.C.
§ 41, and therefore includes bankruptcy jurisdiction.59
Outside of the bankruptcy context, courts are understandably less likely to
find that parties are able to avoid § 405(h)’s jurisdictional bar. For example,
courts have held that claims brought under mandamus jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.
§ 1361) and diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) are not excused from
Medicare’s exhaustion requirement.60 Although § 405(h)’s plain language

58 E.g., In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015); In re
Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Consol. Med. Transp., Inc., 300
B.R. 435, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003); In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 294 B.R. 423, 428 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2003),
vacated in part, 306 B.R. 20 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d, 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2005); First Am. Health Care of Ga.,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and
superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996); In re Rusnak, 184 B.R. 459,
462–63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Healthmaster Home Health Care, Inc., No. 95-01031A, 1995 WL
928920, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 1995); In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1072 (3d Cir.
1992); In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Shelby
Cty. Healthcare Servs. of Ala., Inc., 80 B.R. 555, 559–60 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987); In re Clawson Med., Rehab.
& Pain Care Ctr., P.C., 9 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 12 B.R. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
59 E.g., In re Hodges, 364 B.R. 304, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (analyzing in the Social Security
context); In re House of Mercy, Inc., 353 B.R. 867, 872 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2006); Excel Home Care, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 316 B.R. 565, 572 (D. Mass. 2004); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. v. James, 256 B.R. 479, 481 (W.D. Ky. 2000); In re Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 258 B.R. 53, 56 (S.D.
Fla. 2000); In re Mid-Delta Health Sys., Inc., 251 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1999); In re Tri County
Home Health Servs., Inc., 230 B.R. 106 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999); In re S. Inst. for Treatment & Evaluation,
Inc., 217 B.R. 962, 965 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); In re AHN Homecare, LLC, 222 B.R. 804, 812 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1998); In re Home Comp Care, Inc., 221 B.R. 202, 206 (N.D. Ill. 1998); In re Orthotic Ctr., Inc., 193
B.R. 832, 835 (N.D. Ohio 1996); In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 173 B.R. 238, 245–46 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Upsher Labs., Inc., 135 B.R. 117, 119 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); In re St. Mary Hosp.,
123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Tampa Bay, Inc., 121 B.R. 114 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1990); In re Berger, 16 B.R. 236, 237–38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Clawson, 12 B.R. at 653.
60 E.g., BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 (6th Cir. 2005) (mandamus jurisdiction);
Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1990) (diversity
jurisdiction); Nicole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., No. 10-389, 2011 WL 1162052, at *4
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makes this reading strained, the outcome at least makes more sense in the
context of mandamus and diversity jurisdiction because those jurisdictional
grants are more susceptible to concealing a Medicare claim under the guise of
another claim to improperly avoid going through the Medicare appeals process.
And, more importantly, the parties employing mandamus or diversity statutes
in a federal district court may not face the same potential fate as a hospital that
has initiated bankruptcy proceedings: slow resolution of the claim by the
Medicare appeals process could be that hospital’s death knell. In short, debtors
in bankruptcy courts fighting for their survival should be treated differently
under the law.
A. Overview of § 405(h) Litigation in Bankruptcy Courts
1. In re Clawson Medical, Rehabilitation and Pain Care Center
Three cases capture the bulk of the substantive arguments employed in the
analysis between § 405(h) and bankruptcy jurisdiction. Among the first cases
to discuss the issue, 1981’s In re Clawson Medical, Rehabilitation and Pain
Care Center,61 also happens to be among the most comprehensive. Clawson
involved a Medicare service provider that sought the bankruptcy court’s order
enjoining Medicare from taking actions that would have “reduced the debtor’s
revenues below levels at which the business can be operated.”62 The Clawson
court noted that this factual context was “becoming increasingly familiar to the
courts,” albeit not in the bankruptcy context.63 The debtor alleged that the
changes in its Medicare payments rendered the continuation of its business
untenable and, combined with delays in the Medicare appeals review process,
would cause it to cease operations.64 The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s
motion.65
The Clawson court first reasoned that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
197866 gave the bankruptcy courts “exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor’s

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011) (diversity jurisdiction); Younes v. Burwell, No. 15-11225, 2015 WL 3556689, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2015) (diversity jurisdiction).
61 9 B.R. 644.
62 Id. at 646.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 649–50, 652.
66 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 301). At
the time, the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute was 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (1978).
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property.”67 This, in turn, authorized bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a
debtor’s estate and claims “irrespective of congressional statements to the
contrary in the context of specialized legislation.”68 This jurisdiction included
jurisdiction over issues the resolution of which would “have a considerable
impact on the [debtor’s] estate and on its prospects for effecting a successful
reorganization.”69 Because such determinations were “crucial” to the
administration of the debtor’s estate, the Clawson court found it had
jurisdiction over the debtor’s claims, irrespective of the language of § 405(h).70
The Clawson court then went on to explain that § 405(h) did not bar its
jurisdiction over the debtor’s claims because it only applies “in disputes to
which it is applicable.”71 And because § 405(h) did not expressly bar
jurisdiction under what was then numbered 28 U.S.C. § 1471, it did not bar
review of the debtor’s Medicare claims.72 Indeed, the court reasoned, “[s]uch
omission has been found to permit review under other sections of Title 28[]
and is indicative of Congressional intent not to preclude jurisdiction.”73 The
court noted that the Bankruptcy Reform Act “extensively” amended the
Bankruptcy Code but did not include a reference to the revised statute in
§ 405(h) and concluded that, “in the absence of ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ of legislative intent to preclude or condition this Court’s jurisdiction,
no further barriers will be erected.”74 This reasoning was consistent with
Congress’s intent for revamping the Bankruptcy Code: eliminating the
“frequent, time-consuming and expensive litigation of the question whether the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a particular proceeding.”75 One way to

67 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 647. This authorizes bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a debtor’s estate and claims
“irrespective of congressional statements to the contrary in the context of specialized legislation.” See also In
re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991).
68 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 647.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 647–48.
71 Id. at 648.
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d Cir. 1977); Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States,
536 F.2d 347, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Fox v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1980) (emphasis added), rev’d, 12
B.R. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Ark. Soc’y of Pathologists v. Harris, CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide, ¶ 30,
706 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
74 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 648 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974); Chelsea Comm.
Hosp., SNF v. Mich. Blue Cross Ass’n, 630 F.2d 1131, 1132–36 (6th Cir. 1980); Wayne State Univ. v.
Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1980)).
75 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 648–49 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 45 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6007).
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accomplish such a goal was through a comprehensive jurisdictional grant to the
bankruptcy courts over the debtor’s estate and its corresponding claims.76
Finally, in the context of its preliminary injunction analysis, the Clawson
court discussed in depth both (1) the harm the debtor would face if it were
forced to stop operating because its Medicare payments were stopped and
(2) that the Medicare review process took so long the debtor became unable to
cover its operating expenses.77 It found that, once shut down, the likelihood the
debtor would be able to revive the business would be low, in part due to the
“loss of goodwill” the debtor would suffer as a result.78 Because revival would
be unlikely, the debtor would be forced to liquidate, and the estate’s value at
liquidation would likewise have decreased in value due to the shutdown.79 The
Clawson court recognized (as courts regularly do in the trademark and
intellectual property context, for example) that the value of lost goodwill
would be “difficult if not impossible” to calculate and recover in monetary
damages.80 Moreover, shutting down would harm the debtor’s patients and
employees, who would be forced to seek out other facilities and jobs—an
unnecessary toll on innocent parties, particularly if the debtor’s claims were
successful.81 For all these reasons, the Clawson court determined the “best”
reading of the statute was that it had jurisdiction over the debtor’s Medicare
claims.82
2. In re St. Johns Home Health Agency
The second case, decided nearly fifteen years later, was In re St. Johns
Home Health Agency,83 and there, the bankruptcy court came to a different
conclusion. Faced with facts similar to Clawson, the St. Johns court declined to
take jurisdiction over the debtor’s Medicare claims in the bankruptcy court for
three primary reasons. First, it found that the absence of reference to
bankruptcy jurisdiction in § 405(h) was due to a scrivener’s error, basing its
conclusion on § 405(h)’s “legislative history,” and thus bankruptcy jurisdiction
76

Id. at 649.
Id. at 650–52.
78 Id. at 650.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 650–51; see also Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. v. Elkhatib, No. 09 C 1912, 2009 WL
2192753, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2009) (stating that loss of goodwill is impossible to quantify or reverse).
81 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 651.
82 Id.
83 173 B.R. 238, 242, 247–48 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994). Sam Maizel, one of this Article’s authors,
represented the United States in In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc.
77
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was incorporated implicitly by reference.84 Second, the court voiced concern
that, if it did have jurisdiction, a hospital might use a bankruptcy filing as a
“shortcut to judicial review” of a party’s administrative claims.85 Finally, and
perhaps most surprisingly, the St. Johns court indicated that it did not matter
whether, as a result of its ruling, the debtor would be unable to reorganize.86
3. In re Healthback
The third case is 1999’s In re Healthback.87 Like the court in Clawson, the
court in Healthback also concluded that independent bankruptcy jurisdiction
existed to cover the claim, that § 405(h)’s plain language does not include
§ 1346’s bankruptcy jurisdictional grant, and that jurisdiction was supported by
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code because the debtor might cease to exist
without its protection.88
The Healthback court also addressed three new arguments. First, it held
that § 405(h)’s legislative history cautioning courts against reading a
substantive change into the technical modifications is inapposite because
§ 405(h)’s jurisdictional grant is procedural in nature.89 This argument is
discussed in more detail in Section V below. Second, it rejected the Secretary’s
argument that it could not “judicial[ly] review” the debtor’s Medicare claim.90
According to the court, “judicial review” means “review of an administrative
decision [in] an adjudicatory process to directly determine [its] legality.”91
Thus, “judicial review” is not what a bankruptcy court does; instead,
bankruptcy courts “exercise jurisdiction over the property of the estate to
ensure that all creditors are treated equally within the scope of the Bankruptcy

84

Id. at 244; see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162.
St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 173 B.R. at 243 (“[T]he possibility that its administrative remedy
may not provide relief as quickly as St. Johns desires, or indeed may require to survive, is one of the
potentially unfortunate consequences of doing business in a heavily regulated field where compensation is
highly dependent upon administrative processes. . . . [P]roviders which [sic] choose to operate within the
Medicare system on a cash-poor basis take a knowing risk that an intermediary’s determination might delay
payment, and their risk of being forced out of business alone does not justify a fundamental deviation from the
statutory scheme[.]” (citing V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1034 (11th Cir.1983), cert.
denied 466 U.S. 936 (1984))).
86 173 B.R. at 242, 243–44.
87 226 B.R. 464, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 35012949 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999).
88 Id. at 469–71, 473–74.
89 Id. at 472–73.
90 Id. at 469–70.
91 Id.
85
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Code.”92 That a bankruptcy court’s administration of the debtor’s estate might
frustrate the Secretary’s jurisdiction does not “constitute illegal interference”
with the same.93 Finally, the court rejected the Secretary’s “primary
jurisdiction doctrine” argument, which would require a judicial body to defer
the decision-making process to the administrative agency’s “special
competence.”94 The Healthback court determined that the doctrine cannot be
relied upon at the “whim” of a pleader and instead may only be invoked “if the
benefits of obtaining the agency’s aid would outweigh the need to resolve the
litigation expeditiously.”95
4. Other § 405(h) Arguments Analyzed in the Bankruptcy Context
Other arguments courts have considered when determining whether the
§ 405(h) jurisdictional bar applies in bankruptcy cases include: whether
Medicare payments are themselves an asset in the debtor’s estate,96 whether a

92

Id. at 470.
Id.
94 Id. at 470–71 (“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, generally, requires that where a matter has been
placed under the authority and special competence of an administrative body, the courts should suspend
judicial process until that administrative body has had the opportunity to address the issue in question.”).
95 Id. at 471.
96 The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
Property of the estate includes “all legal or equitable interests . . . in property” held by the debtor “as of
commencement of the case.” Id. The phrase “legal or equitable interests” in property includes “every
conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossesssory, contingent, speculative, and derivative.” In re
Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Although § 541(a) defines what interests of the
debtor become property of the estate, applicable non-bankruptcy law, usually state law, determines the
existence and scope of the debtor’s interest in a particular asset as of commencement of the case. Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by state law.”); McCarthy,
Johnson & Miller v. N. Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pettit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, courts
have held that the scope of § 541(a) includes “contingent future payments that were subject to a condition
precedent on the date of bankruptcy.” In re Bagen, 186 B.R. 824, 829 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175–76 (1977)), aff’d, 201 B.R. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). However, courts are
split on whether government medical payments, such as Medicare or Medicaid, constitute “property.”
Compare Sulphur Manor, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV-15-250, 2015 WL 4409062, at *2 (E.D. Okla. July 20,
2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1981)) (“Medicaid
providers do not have a property right to continued enrollment as a qualified provider.”), with First Am. Health
Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 990 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated
and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996) (“First American is entitled
to bi-weekly PIPs because it continues to provide reimbursable services to Medicare beneficiaries under the
Provider Agreements.”). Section 541(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly states that any “interest of the
debtor in property becomes property of the [debtor’s] estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in an
agreement . . . or applicable nonbankruptcy law that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the
debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A). Additionally, § 542(b) requires that “an entity that owes a debt that is
property of the estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to, or
93
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debtor going out of business because its Medicare payments stopped and it
could not appeal quickly enough to remain in operation will result in
“precluding” review of the debtor’s claims or merely “postpone” it,97 whether
the government will be harmed if it is not able to be the first to review and
decide the debtor’s claims,98 and whether permitting such jurisdiction will
encourage bankruptcy filings simply to avoid the agency’s review process.99
In 2015, two significant bankruptcy court opinions involving the
termination of Medicare payments and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in
light of § 405(h) were issued: In re Bayou Shores100 and Nurses’ Registry &
Home Health Corp. v. Burwell.101 As discussed in more detail below, both
found that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is not barred by § 405(h).
B. The In re Bayou Shores Decisions
1. The Facts of Bayou Shores
Bayou Shores involved a skilled nursing facility (“SNF”) that was facing
termination from the Medicare program, and, by extension, being forced to

on the order of, the trustee, except to the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of [the
Bankruptcy Code] against a claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 542(b).
97 See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 19 (2000).
98 In re Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 472 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999
WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999) (“[A]dministrative inconvenience is not grounds for
denying debtors their statutory rights, as a matter of due process. Thus, even though the exercise of this court’s
jurisdiction might cause administrative difficulties for the Department of Health and Human Services, these
difficulties are not sufficient grounds for denying jurisdiction.” (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
690 (1973); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 506–07 (1975))); First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 991 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 962007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996) (“If the relief sought by Parent and its providers is
not granted, the Debtors are out of business, its approximately 15,000 employees will be out of work, and
approximately 32,000 patients will be without, at least temporarily, needed home health care services.
Conversely, the potential harm to the Defendants, if any, is completely pecuniary, does not affect people’s
health and well-being, is less immediate in effect, and more easily corrected at a later date than the sudden
termination of health care services to infirm, disabled, or poor people.”).
99 Healthback, 226 B.R. at 470, 474 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (“[T]here is no indication that the debtor
filed this bankruptcy case merely to circumvent the administrative requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405 to obtain
‘judicial review’ of the withholding. . . . It seems highly improbable to this court that every home health care
provider will declare bankruptcy for the purpose of avoiding the Medicare administrative requirements in
response to this court exercising jurisdiction in this case.”).
100 525 B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014). Although In re Bayou Shores presents interesting issues
related to the automatic stay and executory contracts, among others, this Article will only discuss whether
bankruptcy courts can be used to avoid fatal delay in obtaining judicial review of CMS’s decisions.
101 533 B.R. 590 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015).
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close its doors.102 The debtor operated a 159-bed SNF for patients with serious
psychiatric conditions in St. Petersburg, Florida.103 The vast majority—over 90
percent—of the debtor’s revenue was derived from Medicare and Medicaid.104
Between February and July of 2014, the debtor was cited on three separate
occasions for noncompliance with Medicare Program requirements.105 The
debtor immediately cured the first two citations and CMS found the debtor to
be in substantial compliance. Thereafter, the debtor also cured the third
deficiency and hired an outside consultant to conduct a comprehensive review
of the debtor’s corrective measures.106 Nevertheless, CMS did not visit the
facility and instead elected to terminate the SNF’s Medicare Provider
Agreement.107 Although the debtor appealed the decision to terminate, that
appeal did not prevent CMS from denying payments.108 On August 1, 2014,
two days before the provider agreements were going to be terminated, the
debtor filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
seeking an injunction to prohibit the termination of the provider agreement.109
On the same day, the district court entered a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) prohibiting the termination of the agreements until August 15,
2014.110 However, once the government briefed the district court on the
administrative exhaustion requirements described above, the district court
dissolved the TRO.111
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision Pertaining to Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
over Medicare Matters
Unable to pay its bills, the debtor filed a chapter 11 petition and sought an
order preventing CMS from terminating the Medicare Provider Agreement
between the debtor and the Medicare Program. The bankruptcy court granted
that motion, and the debtor quickly filed a plan of reorganization and sought its
confirmation. In its objection to confirmation, CMS argued that the bankruptcy
court could not take jurisdiction over the Medicare disputes unless and until
102

Bayou Shores, 525 B.R. 160.
Id. at 161.
104 Id. at 162.
105 Id. at 163.
106 Id. at 164.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 164–65.
111 See Bayou Shores SNF, LLC v. Burwell, No. 8:14-cv-1849-T-33MAP, 2014 WL 4101761, at *8–10
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014).
103
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the debtor exhausted its administrative remedies, relying on the Medicare
statutes described above. The bankruptcy court rejected that argument and
confirmed the plan over CMS’s objection.112 The bankruptcy court ruled that it
had jurisdiction because the plain language of § 405(h) did not restrict
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The bankruptcy court referenced a similar
decision in First American Health Care of Georgia, Inc. v. HHS,113 although
noting that this decision had been vacated because of a subsequent settlement
between the parties.
3. The District Court’s Decision Pertaining to Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
over Medicare Matters
HHS appealed the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the debtor’s plan to
the district court. The appeal of the confirmation order raised the jurisdictional
issue of whether § 405(h) precluded the bankruptcy court from taking any
action related to the Medicare Provider Agreement. In ruling on the appeals,
the district court made several conclusions. First, “the bankruptcy court erred
because as a matter of law the jurisdictional bar in Section 405(h) precluded
the Bankruptcy Court from delaying or preventing the effect of CMS
determination that the provider agreements should be terminated.”114 Second,
the bankruptcy court’s decision that it had jurisdiction under § 1334 was in
error because it ignored the jurisdictional bar provided for in the Medicare Act,
and that “[t]he Bankruptcy Court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction when
it interfered with CMS termination of the provider agreements.”115 Third, that
“[t]here is no jurisdiction for a court to interpose itself in a provider’s
termination from the Medicare and Medicaid programs except to provide
judicial review under Section 405(g) only after administrative remedies have
been exhausted and the Secretary has issued a final agency decision.”116 The
district court, therefore, ruled that the bankruptcy court lacked the jurisdiction
because of the requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies included
in § 405(h).

112 Michael Nordskog, Nursing Homes Chapter 11 Plan Ruled Feasible Despite Medicare Problems,
WESTLAW Bankruptcy Daily Briefing, Jan. 8, 2015, at 2015 WL 94779.
113 208 B.R. 985 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996).
114 Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC), 533
B.R. 337, 340 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
115 Id. at 341.
116 Id.
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4. Bayou Shores’s Appeal
The debtor appealed the district court’s ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals and moved to stay the termination of its Medicare payments
pending the appeal. Although the Eleventh Circuit denied the stay, the district
court granted it after Bayou Shores filed an emergency motion. In so holding,
the district court noted:
Bayou Shores presented ample evidence that absent a stay it and its
patients, employees, and staff will suffer irreparable damage. The
Court finds that if the stay is not continued, Bayou Shores will no
longer be able to operate and will be forced to discharge its patients
and terminate its staff. Notably, this evidence also relates to the
public interest, an interest that is highly relevant here because it
involves the patients and their family.
***
Medicare and Medicaid are required under both federal and state law
to pay for the care of Bayou Shores’ patients regardless of where they
reside, whether it be at Bayou Shores or at any other nursing home.117
***
As Bayou Shores noted, there is a significant factor of human dignity
at issue here that this Court cannot ignore. Bayou Shores’ patients
are comfortable, they know the staff, they have the same routines,
and they retain some dignity and independence from this comfort and
familiarity. It would be draconian to disrupt their dignity based on a
jurisdictional debate that has resulted in significant contrary opinions
among the circuit courts and the lower courts.118

Curiously, the district court highlighted the very policy reasons for
permitting the speedy resolution of a debtor’s Medicare disputes in a
bankruptcy court, rather than through the Medicare appeals process, which
would similarly cause providers to shutter their doors and harm their patients.
The case is currently pending in the Eleventh Circuit.

117 In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, No. 8:14-BK-9521-MGW, 2015 WL 6502704, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct.
27, 2015).
118 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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C. The Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp. Decision
In Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp. v. Burwell, the bankruptcy court
granted the debtor’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order enjoining the suspension of debtor’s Medicare
payments.119 The government filed a motion to stay pending appeal.120 In
reviewing the defendants’ motion, the bankruptcy court analyzed § 405(h)’s
jurisdictional bar in the context of the “likelihood of success” factor of the
preliminary injunction standard.121
The Nurses’ Registry court ultimately held that the government had a very
low likelihood of success on the merits of its jurisdictional arguments on
appeal, and in so doing expressly rejected the “legislative history” line of
cases.122 To begin, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor fell within an
exception to § 405(h)’s jurisdictional bar because waiting for the Medicare
review process to finish would have caused the debtor to “become defunct”
and resulted in “no judicial review of its claims.”123 The bankruptcy court then
turned to the legislative history arguments. First, the bankruptcy court held
that, even if the change in § 405(h) from § 41 to §§ 1331 and 1346 was a
“scrivener’s error,” the court did not have the power to correct that error and
enforce § 405(h) as barring all of § 41’s jurisdictional grants, including
bankruptcy.124 Second, the bankruptcy court noted that:
[A]t least several of the technical amendments Congress enacted in
the DRA made undeniably substantive changes to Social Security and
Medicare, belying Congress’s blanket assertion that none of the
technical amendments were intended to affect any preexisting rights
or interpretations, and thus, the suggestion to the contrary in the
legislative history could not be given credence.125

119

533 B.R. 590, 591 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015).
Id.
121 Id. at 592.
122 Id. at 592–93, 594–96.
123 Id. at 593 (“Had this Court waited for the Medicare process to play itself out while Medicare continued
to suspend payments, the Debtor would have become defunct, and the Debtor would never have been heard on
its request for turnover. Thus, channeling the Debtor’s claims through the agency would mean no judicial
review of its claims at all.”).
124 Id. at 595 (“If Congress hoped to bar all federal jurisdiction over unexhausted Medicare claims but
mistakenly believed it could do so by only barring § 1331 and § 1346 jurisdiction, this Court cannot correct
their mistake.”).
125 Id. at 595–96.
120
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The Nurses’ Registry court highlighted, as an example, the repealing of “an
entire title of the SSA, Title XIII, which provided a program of unemployment
benefits for federal seamen,” and noted that, “[i]f the DRA’s technical
amendments truly did not ‘chang[e] or affect[ ] any right,’ the Reconversion
Unemployment Benefits for Seamen program is still federal law.”126
As discussed in more detail below, the interpretation and application of
§ 405(h) by the courts in Bayou Shores and Nurses’ Registry should be more
widely followed, while the so-called legislative history rationale should be
abandoned. If Congress does not want to provide bankruptcy courts with
jurisdiction over pre-exhaustion review of a debtor-hospital’s Medicare claims,
it should so legislate.
IV. SECTION 405(h)’S “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION
For § 405(h) to prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over a
hospital’s Medicare appeal, three conjunctive elements must be satisfied:
(1) the claims must arise under the Medicare Act, (2) the party must be seeking
“judicial review,” and (3) the action must be brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
or 1346.127 However, the Bankruptcy Code has its own jurisdictional statute
that confers exclusive jurisdiction to the district and bankruptcy courts over
cases “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code and involving the debtor’s
property.128 The Bankruptcy Code’s exclusive jurisdictional grant, combined
with its fundamental purpose of providing debtors with an opportunity to have
a “fresh start,” makes it clear that it—and not the Medicare Act—should
govern who determines a debtor’s disputes with Medicare.
Claims “arise under” the Medicare Act when their resolution is
“inextricably intertwined” with benefits determinations129 and when their
“standing and substantive bas[e]s” are created by the Medicare Act.130 In a
126

Id. at 596; see also discussion infra at note 225.
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2015); In re Healthback L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 470 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998),
vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999).
128 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), (b) & (e) (2015).
129 Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 621–24 (1984).
130 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1975); see also In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc.,
173 B.R. 238, 244 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020,
1025 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 936 (1984)) (“The central target of § 405(h) preclusion is ‘any
action envisioning recovery on any claim emanating from’ the Medicare Act.”). Courts will not indulge
“cleverly concealed claims for benefits” that, by means of a sort of artful pleading, attempt to mask a Medicare
benefits claim behind some other cause of action. Quinones v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., No. CIV. 14-00497
LEK, 2015 WL 3965961, at *3 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015).
127
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vacuum, it would appear obvious that a hospital seeking to continue its
Medicare payments after a CMS termination would “arise under” the Medicare
Act.131 But when a hospital becomes a debtor, the analysis changes.
To begin, although § 405(h) is said to prohibit a court’s “judicial review”
of Medicare decisions, a bankruptcy court exercising jurisdiction over a
debtor’s estate is not “judicial review” of a Medicare Program decision, but is
rather an effort to ensure the debtor’s creditors are treated fairly under the
Bankruptcy Code.132 Thus, the proper view of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction
is that of administering the debtor’s estate (which may include Medicare
payments owed to the debtor) and not a debtor’s improper evasion of the
Medicare appeals process.133 This conclusion is supported by the very fact that
the question arises before a bankruptcy court by a debtor; if an otherwise
solvent hospital wanted merely to challenge a Medicare decision prior to
exhaustion, it would only be able to do so in a federal district court and would
not have to file, among other things, a first day declaration134 to explain that it
is unable to service its debts.135
The Bankruptcy Code’s “arising under” jurisdictional grant should also
trump the Medicare Act’s jurisdictional grant because ignoring the former
when the cessation of Medicare payments is at issue would frustrate the
Bankruptcy Code’s purpose.136 The same fundamental frustration does not
exist, however, if the Medicare Act’s jurisdiction is superseded by a
bankruptcy court. The courts that have found Medicare’s jurisdictional bar
controlling have done so in the context of the legislative history argument,137
131 E.g., Timberlawn Mental Health Sys. v. Burwell, No. 3:15-CV-2556-M, 2015 WL 4868842, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2015) (In the context of a motion for a temporary restraining order, the court held that
“[the Hospital’s] claims arise under the Medicare Act because the Hospital seeks to continue its participation
in the Medicare program pending an administrative appeal of CMS’s termination decision.”).
132 Healthback, 226 B.R. at 469–70.
133 Id.
134 “It is typical (particularly in large bankruptcy cases) for a debtor to file declarations or affirmations in
support of the first day motions. These declarations [generally are signed] by the debtor’s senior management,
[and] give the trade creditor important information about the facts and circumstances leading to the bankruptcy
filing, as well as a preliminary road map for where the case is headed. It will also highlight significant issues
that may impede the efforts to reorganize.” Jeffrey Baddeley, Managing Trade Credit to Struggling
Companies, CORP. FIN. REV., May/June 2013, at 16, 19.
135 See Healthback, 226 B.R. at 470.
136 Courts should be reluctant to interpret a statute in a way that frustrates its purpose. See King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2015) (“Here, the [Affordable Care Act’s] statutory scheme compels us to
reject petitioner’s interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with
a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to avoid.”).
137 E.g., In re Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 258 B.R. 53, 56 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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but that argument presumes—without support—that in the same breath
Congress also intended to exclude a class of debtors (those who rely on
Medicare payments to remain solvent) from bankruptcy protection.138 If a
hospital relies on Medicare payments to survive and those Medicare payments
stop, the hospital shuts down, and the effects ripple throughout its patients,
service providers, and staff.139 To prevent such a (potentially unnecessary)
result, the Bankruptcy Code exists to provide distressed businesses “breathing
space” in which they can reorganize with assistance from the bankruptcy
courts.140 This is why bankruptcy (and district) courts have broad and
exclusive jurisdiction over debtors and their assets and liabilities—without
which external entities, including governmental entities such as CMS, would
be able to interfere with the restructuring process and impinge on a debtor’s
breathing space. Indeed, such interference is expressly prohibited by
protections like the automatic stay, which pauses all litigations pending against
a debtor, and is a protection that would be rendered meaningless if Medicare
jurisdiction governed a debtor’s dispute with Medicare because the debtor
138 See First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 990
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11,
1996) (“First American is entitled to bi-weekly PIPs because it continues to provide reimbursable services to
Medicare beneficiaries under the Provider Agreements.”).
139 The factual background in U.S. ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1296–97
(11th Cir. 2003) aptly sums up the series of events:

The court denied St. Johns’s motion in a written order dated September 23, 1994. It agreed with
the Secretary that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion because St. Johns had not
exhausted its administrative remedies. Assuming that it had jurisdiction, the court added, it could
not “grant effective relief . . . under 11 U.S.C. § 365 without fundamentally and impermissibly
altering the contractual relationship between St. Johns and the Secretary which incorporates the
statutory and administrative scheme imposed by the Medicare Program.” The court’s decision
was St. Johns’s death knell. On November 10, 1994, the court entered an order approving the sale
of St. Johns’s assets (except the above-mentioned lawsuit pending against the Secretary and
CMS) to Amitan Health Services, Inc. On August 21, 1995, St. Johns moved the court to convert
its Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The court granted its motion.
(emphasis added). Accord Livingston Care Ctr., Inc. v. United States, No. 89-40200-FL, 1990 WL 125000, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 1990), aff’d, 934 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Plaintiff’s status as Medicaid provider
was automatically terminated as well, which resulted in extensive lost revenues to plaintiff and its eventual
bankruptcy.” (emphasis added)); see also Sulphur Manor, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV-15-250-RAW, 2015 WL
4409062, at *3 (E.D. Okla. July 20, 2015) (analyzing irreparable injury in a preliminary injunction motion);
Healthback, 226 B.R. at 471 n.8; First Am. Health Care of Ga., 208 B.R. at 989–90; In re Tidewater Mem’l
Hosp., 106 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1989) (analyzing the automatic stay).
140 See In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
language of section 1334(b) grants jurisdiction to the district court, and therefore to the bankruptcy court, over
civil proceedings related to bankruptcy and accords with the intent of Congress to bring all bankruptcy-related
litigation within the umbrella of the district court, at least as an initial matter, irrespective of congressional
statements to the contrary in the context of other specialized litigation.”).
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would then be litigating its rights before both the bankruptcy court and the
Medicare ALJs.141
Moreover, finding that the Bankruptcy Code’s exclusive jurisdictional grant
applies to a debtor’s Medicare Program payments and disputes does not
frustrate the purpose of the Medicare Act. To begin, the argument that it would
negatively impact the Medicare ALJs’ ability to gain expertise rings hollow.142
Medicare ALJs have their hands full with Medicare appeals as it is, and
bankruptcy judges are competent to the task of adjudicating a wide variety of
legal claims—Medicare questions are no different.143 In addition, relieving
Medicare of its jurisdiction over this small subsection of its providers will not
harm the Medicare Act’s purpose. Medicare will continue to function as it
normally does, and in fact, given the backlog of Medicare appeals, losing this
jurisdiction may actually be a relief to a system that is already burdened to the
breaking point.144 Indeed, resolution of the dispute could happen both earlier
and more expeditiously if administered by a bankruptcy judge, preserving the
Medicare Program’s scarce administrative resources.
Even if a court were to find that Medicare’s jurisdictional grant trumps the
Bankruptcy Code’s, bankruptcy courts would still be the proper venue to
resolve a debtor’s Medicare disputes because § 405(h) does not apply to bar a
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.

141 See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Rusnak, 184 B.R. 459,
462–63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. at 880 (“Here, however, the Government’s
action in apparent violation of the automatic stay provisions of § 362 could well prevent the debtor from
having an opportunity for rehabilitation and reorganization. There is an urgency here which goes beyond the
domain of Medicare law, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be allowed to
frustrate the clearly stated goals of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
142 In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“Moreover, a broad reading of section 405(h)
puts its interpretation in accord with Congress’ intent to permit the Secretary in Medicare disputes to develop
the record and base decisions upon his unique expertise in the health care field.”).
143 See, e.g., Healthback, 226 B.R. at 472 n.10 (“Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) the court has the power to
issue any order[,] process[,] or judgment necessary or appropriate to execute the provisions of Title 11. In
almost all bankruptcy cases, the creditors and parties are inconvenienced to some degree. This court perceives
no reason why the Department of Health and Human Services should receive special consideration in this
context.”); First Am. Health Care of Ga., 208 B.R. at 991 (observing that the government is actually better off
if the debtor continues receiving its payments because that increases its chances of exiting bankruptcy and
repaying the government).
144 Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing on Exploring Medicare Appeal Reform
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Healthcare &
Entitlements, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief A.L.J., Office of Medicare Hearings
and Appeals), www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/07/t20140710a.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
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V. INTERPRETING MEDICARE’S JURISDICTIONAL BAR
A. Discussion of Plain Language Argument
It is hornbook law that unambiguous language in a statute is given its plain
meaning: “[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to
be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency
of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect
would discover.”145
1. The Plain Language of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
The words Congress wrote into law in § 405(h) only bar federal court
jurisdiction if the dispute arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1346; bankruptcy
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is not referenced. The Supreme Court
observed as much in Heckler v. Ringer, “The third sentence of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(h), made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii, provides
that § 405(g), to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is the sole avenue for
judicial review for all “claim[s] arising under” the Medicare Act[,]”146 and
again in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., “The statute
[§ 405(h)] plainly bars § 1331 review . . . .”147 The plain meaning of § 405(h)’s
jurisdictional limitations has been adopted by both the Third148 and Ninth
Circuits,149 as well as by numerous district150 and bankruptcy courts,151 and has

145 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925); see also E.P.A. v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1600–01 (2014) (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., Div. of
Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)) (“[A] reviewing court’s task is to apply the text of the
statute, not to improve upon it.”); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 460 (2002); United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); In re Kolich, 328 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive . . . .”).
146 466 U.S. 602, 614–15 (1984) (emphasis added).
147 529 U.S. 1, 10 (2000) (emphasis added).
148 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1072 (3d Cir. 1992).
149 In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991).
150 E.g., Cal. Clinical Lab. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-CV-0673, 2015 WL
2393571, at *10 (D.D.C. May 20, 2015).
151 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015); In re Bayou
Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 294 B.R. 423,
428 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2003), vacated in part, 306 B.R. 20 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d, 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2005); First
Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996); In re
Healthmaster Home Health Care, Inc., No. 95-01031A, 1995 WL 928920, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 13,
1995); In re Shelby Cty. Healthcare Servs. of AL, Inc., 80 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).
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gone unchanged by Congress for over twenty years.152 Although § 405(h) and
§ 1334 are “incongruous,” it is not “absurd” to have a bankruptcy exception
to Medicare’s exhaustion requirement,153 particularly in light of the harm that
can arise to the debtor due to stopped Medicare payments during the lengthy
Medicare review process.154 Thus, courts should not “allow[] ambiguous
legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”155
The Supreme Court recently addressed statutory construction in the health
care context in King v. Burwell,156 and the Court’s analytical framework in
both the majority’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent (both of which capture
the thrust of the Court’s plain language doctrine) strongly support applying
§ 405(h) based on its plain language. In King, the Court was charged with
interpreting the short phrase, “established by the State,” in the Affordable Care
Act, and the outcome of which would either preserve or undermine the entire
statutory scheme.157 The Court chose preservation because it was
“implausible” that Congress would have written the term such that it would
cause a “death spiral” and undermine the entire Affordable Care Act.158 In so
holding, the Court determined that although the words appeared clear on the
surface, they became ambiguous when viewed in light of the entire statute.159
The Court reasoned that, “the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” and only then
can they be deemed non-ambiguous and subject to enforcement based on their
plain meaning.160
Here, neither the context of the Social Security Act nor the Medicare Act
render § 405(h)’s jurisdictional grant over 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346
ambiguous. This is because the structures of the acts and their pertinent
sections do not include contradictory cross-references or jurisdictional terms
that, if defined one way would undermine the entirety of either the Medicare or
Social Security Acts. If anything, relieving the Medicare Program of some of
its appellate review jurisdiction and placing it with the bankruptcy courts for
152

In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015).
Id.
154 See supra at note 139; see also, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1296–
97 (11th Cir. 2003).
155 Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011).
156 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
157 Id. at 2489.
158 Id. at 2492–94.
159 Id. at 2490–91.
160 Id. at 2492.
153
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debtors might actually aid the agency in the execution of its duties, alleviating
some of the burden for its strained system resources to focus on the existing,
crippling backlog of cases currently pending review therein.161
And, of course, Justice Scalia’s dissent propounding the unassailable merits
of the Court’s well-established plain language doctrine supports a reading of
§ 405(h) that limits its jurisdictional bar to §§ 1331 and 1346. Justice Scalia
notes that although “[l]aws often include unusual or mismatched provisions,”
courts may “not revise legislation just because the text as written creates an
apparent anomaly.”162 Here, although § 405(h) may have formerly referred to a
broad jurisdictional provision that included bankruptcy, it currently does not,
and moreover, as it is presently written, § 405(h) contains no anomalies or
references to other mismatched provisions—it clearly states that it applies only
to §§ 1331 and 1346. Justice Scalia’s reasoning continued that, “The purposes
of a law must be ‘collected chiefly from its words,’ not ‘from extrinsic
circumstances.’ Only by concentrating on the law’s terms can a judge hope to
uncover the scheme of the statute, rather than some other scheme that the judge
thinks desirable.”163 In § 405(h), the words “under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28”
plainly omit any reference to bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
And finally, he urged that, “[i]f Congress enacted into law something different
from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform to its
intent.”164 Here, Congress actually did draft something different into law to
change its operation: previously, § 405(h) cited a broad jurisdictional statute
that gave widespread reviewing authority to federal courts; now it cites to two
out of nearly two dozen such jurisdictional grants, many of which were written
or amended after § 405(h) was updated in 1984.

161

Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing on Exploring Medicare Appeal Reform
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Healthcare &
Entitlements, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief A.L.J., Office of Medicare Hearings
and Appeals), www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/07/t20140710a.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
162 Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, 4 L.Ed. 529
(1819) (Marshall, C.J.)).
164 Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)
(quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 380 (1962)) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’
of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); In re W.J.P. Properties, 149 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1992) (citations omitted) (“The Supreme Court has on many occasions stressed that in interpreting
statutes, the court should first look to the statute. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court should
enforce the statute as written without reference to legislative history.”).
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2. The Plain Language of 28 U.S.C. § 1334
The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is equally clear. Section 1334
provides the statutory basis for bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. Specifically, it
provides exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11 and all property of
the debtor and the estate, wherever located, to the district courts, which then
may refer the case to the bankruptcy courts:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
***
(e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or
is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of [] all of the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such
case, and of property of the estate . . . .165

This structure creates no ambiguity,166 and nothing suggests that this exclusive
jurisdictional grant cedes to the Medicare Act.167 Courts have thusly employed
§ 1334’s plain meaning as independent grounds for permitting bankruptcy
jurisdiction over Medicare disputes.168 The Ninth Circuit has reconciled this
165

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (emphasis added).
See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480.
167 See In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added) (“The language of Section 1334(b) grants jurisdiction to the district court, and therefore to the
bankruptcy court, over civil proceedings related to bankruptcy and accords with the intent of Congress to bring
all bankruptcy-related litigation within the umbrella of the district court, at least as an initial matter,
irrespective of congressional statements to the contrary in the context of other specialized litigation.”).
Although the Supreme Court stated, “Section 1334(b) concerns the allocation of jurisdiction between
bankruptcy courts and other ‘courts,’ and, of course, an administrative agency such as the Board is not a
‘court’” in Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1991), that decision
does not apply to the present discussion because there the Board’s decision had not yet been rendered, and the
debtor’s estate had therefore not yet been harmed. Here, CMS would have already stopped payments to the
hospital-debtor, thereby harming the debtor’s estate—a situation expressly carved out of the MCorp. Court’s
decision based on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d): “Moreover, contrary to MCorp’s contention, the prosecution of the
Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a final order and prior to the commencement of any enforcement
action, seems unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the estate
protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d).” Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 42
(1991) (emphasis added); see also Sunflower Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 603 F.2d 791, 796
(10th Cir. 1979) (implying doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable only when agency
has exclusive jurisdiction).
168 E.g., In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming decision that bankruptcy
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides an independent basis for jurisdiction); In re Town & Country
Home Nursing, 963 F.2d at 1154; see also In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1072 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“Because we agree . . . that the Bankruptcy Code supplies an independent basis for jurisdiction in this case,
166
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conclusion with its holdings that have excluded other jurisdictional grants from
§ 405(h). In Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc.,169 the court noted that although
Kaiser v. Blue Cross of California170 held that the absence of any reference to
42 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) in § 405(h) was irrelevant and
diversity jurisdiction was still barred, § 1334’s “broad jurisdictional grant over
all matters conceivably having an effect on the bankruptcy estate” ultimately
carried the day.171 In short, Do Sung Uhm correctly concluded that bankruptcy
is special, which is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s plain language and
purpose, neither of which are present in a dispute based on diversity
jurisdiction where neither party is insolvent. This outcome is consistent with
the rule of statutory construction that “when two statutes are capable of
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective”172 because
the Medicare Act and Bankruptcy Code “coexist” due to Medicare’s
jurisdictional carve-out for bankruptcy courts in § 405(h).

we reject the Secretary’s arguments and find that the district and bankruptcy courts properly had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 and 1334 and that we may properly exercise jurisdiction over this appeal under
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.”). Nor does § 1334(b)’s “original but not exclusive” language for “all civil
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11” change the analysis. See
Excel Home Care, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 316 B.R. 565, 572 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The
statute itself provides that “unless indicated otherwise by another Act of Congress,” the district courts are
endowed with “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising
in or related to cases under title 11.”). As the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit
explains:
Essentially all litigation within a bankruptcy case is a “civil proceeding” within § 1334(b)
“arising under, arising in, or related to” jurisdiction, which jurisdiction is concurrent with state
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Although such jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts, the
automatic stay renders state jurisdiction more theoretical than real until after the case is closed.
11 U.S.C. § 362. As one would expect, the decisions construing § 1334(b) deal with how to draw
the line at the outer fringe of “related to” matters. Most circuits agree that the test of “related to”
jurisdiction is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the
estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . In short, virtually every act a bankruptcy judge is
called upon to perform in a judicial capacity is a “civil proceeding” within § 1334(b).
In re Menk, 241 B.R. 896, 908–09 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
169 620 F.3d 1134, 1140 n.11 (9th Cir. 2010).
170 347 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003).
171 Do Sung Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1140 n.11.
172 J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001).
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3. Enforcing § 405(h) Based on Its Plain Language Is Consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code’s Purpose
That § 405(h)’s plain language governs its interpretation is supported by
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code: “The purpose of Chapter 11
reorganization is to assist financially distressed business enterprises by
providing them with breathing space in which to return to a viable state.”173
Absent such breathing space, a debtor may be forced to cease its operations,
rendering virtually impossible a return to a viable state. The problem is
particularly acute for hospital-debtors that rely on Medicare payments and
cannot have their Medicare disputes appealed quickly enough to keep
operating.174
A debtor’s breathing space is created by the bankruptcy court’s exclusive
jurisdiction over its estate. If not for this exclusive jurisdiction, the debtor may
be called to defend its assets and debts in multiple courts (here, the Medicare
appeals labyrinth),175 which would create a race to the courthouse for its
creditors and, more importantly, distract the debtor from the important task of
successful reorganization. Indeed, “[o]ne of the primary purposes of revising
the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts [in 1978] was the
elimination of frequent, time-consuming, and expensive litigation of the
question whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a particular
proceeding.”176 Thus, § 1334’s exclusivity provision is susceptible to little
legislative weakness: bankruptcy jurisdiction is exclusive “irrespective of
congressional statements to the contrary in the context of specialized
legislation,” and “in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of

173

In re Golden Ocala P’ship, 50 B.R. 552, 557 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
In re Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (“Here, however, the
Government’s action in apparent violation of the automatic stay provisions of § 362 could well prevent the
debtor from having an opportunity for rehabilitation and reorganization. There is an urgency here which goes
beyond the domain of Medicare law, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be
allowed to frustrate the clearly stated goals of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
175 To require a hospital to complete the “complex and time-consuming maze of the [Medicare]
administrative review process” as a prerequisite to obtaining bankruptcy relief will “virtually ignore the
purpose of the changes in the jurisdictional grant enacted in the [1978] Reform Act elimination of delay and
expense as a barrier to a successful reorganization.” In re Clawson Med., Rehab. & Pain Care Ctr., P.C., 9
B.R. 644, 49 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 12 B.R. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
176 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 648–49.
174
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legislative intent to preclude or condition [a bankruptcy c]ourt’s jurisdiction,
no further barriers will be erected.”177
If a hospital is not provided with breathing space and Medicare is allowed
to stop its payments while the hospital appeals an adverse CMS decision, the
hospital may well run out of money and be forced to stop operating before the
appeals process is complete.178 True, § 405(h) is meant to act as a channeling
requirement where virtually all challenges to Medicare decisions go through
the agency.179 This scheme becomes problematic, however, when adhering to it
means “killing the patient to cure the disease.”180 And killing the patient can be
precisely what happens when a court requires hospitals to appeal a decision
that stops their essential Medicare payments through the Medicare appeals
process: if the hospital dies before its Medicare appeal can be heard, it
effectively will have lost its opportunity for meaningful judicial review,181 and
in turn, it will be difficult or impossible to reorganize.182 Consequently,

177

Id. at 648 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974); Chelsea Comm. Hosp., SNF v. Mich.
Blue Cross Ass’n, 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1980); Wayne St. Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632 (6th Cir.
1980)).
178 See First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 989–90
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11,
1996).
179 Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice, Inc. v. Burwell, 77 F.Supp.3d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2015).
180 See In re Jewish Mem’l Hosp., 13 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
181 E.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 22–23 (2000) (emphasis omitted)
(“Rather, the question is whether, as applied generally to those covered by a particular statutory provision,
hardship likely found in many cases turns what appears to be simply a channeling requirement into complete
preclusion of judicial review.”); Frontier Health Inc. v. Shalala, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1193 (E.D. Tenn. 2000)
(“If Woodridge Hospital were forced to close down before its administrative remedies had been exhausted, it
would not be in a position to seek judicial review at the close of the administrative process.”). Outside of the
bankruptcy context, courts are unlikely to find this reasoning persuasive. See, e.g., Fox Ins. Co v. Sebelius, 381
F. App’x 93, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Fox’s claimed financial harm does not constitute the circumstances in
which the CMS’s actions and their effects on Fox are subject to ‘no review at all.’ Illinois Council does not
hold that where a party may suffer economic hardship it may sidestep administrative review.”); Sulphur
Manor, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV-15-250-RAW, 2015 WL 4409062, at *3 (E.D. Okla. July 20, 2015); Cal.
Clinical Lab. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-CV-0673, 2015 WL 2393571, at *10 (D.D.C.
May 20, 2015). However, bankruptcy courts, employing their expertise on the matters affecting debtors’
estates, frequently find otherwise. E.g., U.S. ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1296–97
(11th Cir. 2003); In re Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 471 n.8 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 9722616, 1999 WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999); First Am. Health Care of Ga., 208 B.R. at
989–90; In re Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1989).
182 See, e.g., Sulphur Manor, 2015 WL 4409062, at *3 (“The court does find a showing of irreparable
injury in the assertion that plaintiff will go out of business upon termination of the provider agreements . . . .”);
Healthback, 226 B.R. at 471 n.8 (“In this matter, where there is no timely administrative remedy available to
the debtor, this court will not require the debtor to, literally, commit suicide to adhere to this rule.”); First Am.
Health Care of Ga., Inc, 208 B.R. at 989–90; Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. at 880.
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patients will have lost their access to care, Medicare will have lost a provider
that potentially could reorganize and improve, and the hospital’s employees
will have lost their jobs.183 But “[i]f there is not a potentially viable business in
place worthy of protection and rehabilitation, the Chapter 11 effort has lost its
raison d’etre.”184 Because the Bankruptcy Code in general—and chapter 11 in
particular—exist to prevent the unnecessary shuttering of businesses that are
temporarily but not irreversibly experiencing hardship, reading the natural
language of § 405(h) as omitting reference to the Bankruptcy Code’s
jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 fully supports the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code.185
B. Discussion of the “Legislative History” Argument
The argument that § 405(h), as it is currently written, prevents bankruptcy
courts from hearing Medicare claims prior to exhaustion of administrative
remedies is based on explanatory language enacted by Congress when § 405(h)
was amended in 1984.186 This argument fails for six reasons, summarized here
and explained in greater detail below.
First, to the extent § 2664(b) of the Deficit Reduction Act can be read as
applying only to preclude substantive changes (a conclusion not supported by
the statute’s language), jurisdictional statutes are procedural, not substantive,
and are therefore not covered by § 2664(b)’s directive.
Second, the 1948 re-codification of 28 U.S.C. § 41 did include substantive
changes, and applying § 405(h) in 2015 to a jurisdictional statute dating back
nearly a century (that includes, for example, a jurisdictional grant for questions
pertaining to slavery) leads to absurd results.
183

See, e.g., First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc., 208 B.R. at 989–90.
In re Golden Ocala P’ship, 50 B.R. 552, 557 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
185 This outcome is consistent with other unique provisions in the Bankruptcy Code dealing with
governmental entities. For example, § 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits governmental entities from
denying, revoking, superseding, or refusing to “renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar
grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against . . . a person that is or has
been a debtor under” the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). The similar provisions dealing with private
employers is much more limited. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b). Section 525(a) has been applied to licenses and
government contracts and applied to prohibit the Medicare program from refusing to allow entities that have
been through bankruptcy from future participation as a Medicare provider. See, e.g., In re St. Mary Hosp., 89
B.R. 503, 504 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). But see E.H. Sperow, Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Plainly
Does Not Apply to Medicare Provider Agreements, 34 J. HEALTH L. 487, 487–500 (2001). See generally F.C.C.
v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003); In re Stoltz, 315 F.3d 80, 95 (2d Cir. 2002).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 7, 11–18; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162.
184
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Third, since its extraction from § 41, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (bankruptcy
jurisdiction) has been amended and expanded several times as part of
significant revisions to the entire Bankruptcy Code. Ignoring this presumes
Congress meant to preclude certain individuals and businesses from
bankruptcy protection—despite a lack of express language so stating—while it
was at the same time greatly increasing the jurisdictional authority of
bankruptcy courts.
Fourth, in addition to the changes to § 405(h), many of the other
amendments made by Congress in § 2663 of the DRA affected parties’
substantive and procedural rights and liabilities. This (combined with the
second and third reasons above) lends strong evidence to an argument that the
real scrivener’s error is the overbroad catchall in § 2664(b) that none of the
250 sub-sections of the U.S. Code that § 2663 amended did so in a way that
altered a party’s rights or liabilities.
Fifth, § 2664(b) is labeled “Effective Dates” and ends with the limitation,
“before that date.” Just eight days “before that date” of the DRA’s enactment,
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1984 was passed, reaffirming the bankruptcy
court’s exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor’s case and estate. The plain
language of § 2664(b) therefore prohibits courts from ignoring the rights
created in the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
Sixth and finally, even if the Office of Revision Counsel’s change, which
was then codified by Congress, was a “scrivener’s error,” courts are not
permitted to correct technical legislative errors.
1. Jurisdiction Under § 405(h) is Procedural, Not Substantive
Assuming that § 2664(b) only applies to preclude any substantive changes
that may be read into § 2663 (a conclusion unsupported by § 2664(b)’s plain
language), such a preclusion would not apply to prevent alteration to § 405(h)
because jurisdictional grants are procedural, not substantive.
As discussed above, Congress expressly enacted the Law Revision
Counsel’s changes to § 405(h) as part of the DRA.187 As part of that

187 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2663(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. 1162 (“Section 205(h) of
such Act is amended by striking out ‘section 24 of the Judicial Code of the United States’ and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘section 1331 or 1346 of title 28, United States Code . . . .’”). Changes to a statute by the Law Revision
Counsel are not binding absent enactment by Congress.
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legislation, Congress included a provision entitled, “Effective Dates,” which
stated in § 2664(b) that:
Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle,
the amendments made by section 2663 shall be effective on the date
of the enactment of this Act; but none of such amendments shall be
construed as changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or
interpretation which existed (under the provisions of law involved)
before that date.188

Beginning in 1990 with Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas.,189
courts have tended to assume, without explanation, that § 2664(b) applies only
to substantive and not procedural changes.190 However, a close reading of the
statute and an analysis of its precise terms suggests otherwise. Section 2664(b)
states, “none of such amendments shall be construed as changing or affecting
any right, liability, status, or interpretation.”191 By its plain language, the word
“right” in § 2664 is not qualified. As such, it is equally plausible—and, indeed,
likely—that “right” includes both substantive and procedural rights. Moreover,
Black’s Law Dictionary includes a definition for “right,” “substantive right,”
and “procedural right.”192
In either event, to the extent that § 2664(b) does refer exclusively to
substantive changes, it does not apply to § 405(h)’s jurisdictional bar, which is
procedural in nature.193 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “substantive law” as,
“[t]he part of law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and

188

Id. § 2664(b) (emphasis added).
903 F.2d 480, 489 (7th Cir. 1990).
190 E.g., Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc., 903 F.2d at 489); BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 (6th
Cir. 2005); Midland Psychiatric Associates, Inc. v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 543, 549 (W.D. Mo. 1997),
aff’d, 145 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 1998); Nicole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10389, 2011 WL 1162052, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011); Reg’l Med. Transp., Inc. v. Highmark, Inc., 541
F.Supp. 2d 718, 731 (E.D. Pa. 2, 2008); Excel Home Care, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 316
B.R. 565, 573 (D. Mass. 2004); Allstar Care Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1295,
1298 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Total Renal Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 1999); In re
Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 473 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 35012949
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999); In re House of Mercy, Inc., 353 B.R. 867, 871 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2006); In re AHN
Homecare, LLC, 222 B.R. 804, 808 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998); In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
191 Deficit Reduction Act § 2664(b).
192 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 623–24 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
193 See Deficit Reduction Act § 2664(b).
189
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powers of the parties.”194 Black’s further defines “right” as, inter alia,
“[s]omething that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral
principle,” “[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law,” and
“[a] legally enforceable claim that another will do or will not do a given act; a
recognized and protected interest the violation of which is a wrong.”195 A
“substantive right” is, therefore, a “right that can be protected or enforced by
law; a right of substance rather than form,”196 whereas a “procedural right” is a
“right that derives from legal or administrative procedure; a right that helps in
the enforcement of a substantive right.”197 Because jurisdiction, a “court’s
power to decide a case or issue a decree,”198 merely informs the parties of the
proper forum, thereby “help[ing] in the enforcement of a substantive right,”
and does not create, define, or regulate rights—such as those arising under 42
U.S.C. § 405(h) and 28 U.S.C. § 1334—it is a procedural right, not a
substantive one.199 And to the extent § 2664(b) can be read to apply only to
substantive rights, it does not apply to alter the plain meaning of § 405(h).200
Even if the phrase “none of such amendments shall be construed as
changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or interpretation” in § 2664(b)
can be read to apply to both substantive and procedural rights, it still fails to
bar bankruptcy court jurisdiction over Medicare disputes prior to exhaustion
under § 405(h), for the reasons outlined below.

194 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 192, at 686; see also Healthback, 226 B.R. at 473
(“Substantive law. That part of law which creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties of parties, as
opposed to ‘adjective, procedural, or remedial law,’ which prescribes method of enforcing the rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion. The basic law of rights and duties (contract law, criminal law, tort law,
law of wills, etc.) as opposed to procedural law (law of pleading, law of evidence, law of jurisdiction, etc.).”).
195 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 192, at 623–24.
196 Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 393.
199 Note, however, that the label “procedural” is not unassailable. When a procedural rule “makes changes
in remedies, procedures, and evidence[,] such changes can have as profound an impact on behavior outside the
courtroom as avowedly substantive changes.” Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.); see also Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. E.E.O.C., 543 F. Supp. 950, 956 (E.D. Va. 1982)
(discussing facially procedural EEOC rules and their substantive impact and reasoning that when a purportedly
“procedural” rule “trenche[es] upon the rights and obligations of the parties affected” it could be considered
“substantive”), rev’d, 720 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1983).
200 In re Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 474 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999
WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999).
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2. Federal Jurisdiction: Claims Against the United States
If § 405(h) refers to 28 U.S.C. § 41’s jurisdictional grant, and not 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 (federal question) and 1346 (concurrent jurisdiction to the district and
other federal courts as to certain claims against the United States) as indicated
in its text, then the entirety of § 41 must be enforced as it was then written, and
not merely selectively. Applying this reasoning highlights the absurdity of
referring to a law that was abrogated decades ago.
For example, there can be no dispute that § 405(h) covers jurisdiction under
§ 1346.201 Before 1948, § 1346 was part of 28 U.S.C. § 41(20), which at the
time provided that:
No suit against the Government of the United States shall be allowed
under this paragraph unless the same shall have been brought within
six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made. The
claims of married women, first accrued during marriage, of persons
under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, and
of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the
time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the
suit be brought within three years after the disability has ceased; but
no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim
from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate
cumulatively.202

The 1948 amendment broke the statute of limitations out of § 41 and recodified it at 28 U.S.C. § 2401:
[E]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of
action first accrues. The action of any person under legal disability or
beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced
within three years after the disability ceases.203

201 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1946); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1348, 1350 to 1357, 1359, 1397, 2361, 2401, and 2402
(1952); see also Bodimetric Health Servs. Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing
how § 405(h) bars action brought under diversity jurisdiction statute although § 1332 is no longer mentioned in
§ 405(h)); AHN Homecare v. Home Health Reimbursement & HCFA, 222 B.R. 804, 807–08 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1998); In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Tampa Bay,
Inc., 121 B.R. 114 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Absent from the re-codification was, for example, § 41(4)’s grant
of original jurisdiction in the federal district courts for “all suits arising under any law relating to the slave
trade.” 28 U.S.C. § 41(4) (1946).
202 28 U.S.C. § 41(20) (emphasis added).
203 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1952).
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Notably absent from § 2401 is the provision that labels married women
“disabled” and stops the clock from running on the statute of limitations for
claims against the United States while they are married.
Although the “disabled” label is disparaging, if the term were still in effect,
it would actually confer a benefit to married women. If § 405(h)
refers
to
28 U.S.C. § 41, which ceased to exist in 1948, then a married woman whose
claims against the United States arise during marriage would be able to avoid
tolling the statute of limitations on those claims for potentially well beyond the
six-year limit that applies to everyone else (albeit litigation of her claims
would be limited to the Medicare appeals process). For example, if a woman’s
Medicare dispute arises during her marriage and her husband dies nine years
later, then she would still have an additional three years to bring her claim, for
a total limitations period of twelve years, more than double that of a nonmarried woman. Indeed, this is precisely the way courts during that era viewed
28 U.S.C. § 41(20) as operating: “[I]f her marriage tolled the statute, she failed
to start her action within three years after the death of her husband, and is
clearly barred.”204
Circuit and lower courts have held, outside of the bankruptcy context, that
the omission of references to other grants of jurisdiction should be ignored, and
the pre-1984 version of the statute should be applied. These courts reason that
because Congress, in passing the 1984 law that adopted the 1976 revision,
wrote that the 1984 amendments should not be “construed as changing or
affecting any right, liability, status, or interpretation which existed (under the
provisions of law involved) before that date.”205 But if this legislative language
means any changes affecting a person’s rights must be ignored (as some courts
have held), then all such changes—for example, with regard to the
jurisdictional rights of women—would also have to be ignored. Thus, applying
the “guidance” in § 2664(b)’s legislative note also requires ignoring 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401 as it is currently written. Congress could not have intended such an
absurd206 and likely unconstitutional result,207 and in 2016 and beyond, courts
should not employ logical reasoning that would tend to enforce it.

204

Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (M.D.N.C. 1938).
Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that, even in the absence of reference to diversity jurisdiction provision 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in § 405(h), such
suits were still barred).
206 See Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“Section [42
U.S.C.] § 1981 dates back to 1866. It is as unlikely that Congress was attempting to restore section 1981 to the
205
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3. Federal Jurisdiction: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The legislative history argument also fails because applying § 405(h)
to
§ 41 as it was written in 1935208 requires ignoring the numerous (and
painstaking) changes Congress has since made to bankruptcy jurisdiction. In
particular, it would require sidestepping the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts over a debtor’s estate, which was itself written into law to
solve the complex jurisdictional fights that persisted during the preceding
century.209 In short, enforcing 28 U.S.C. § 41 as it was written before 1948
reinvigorates the jurisdictional morass that subsequent amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code were expressly written to address—indeed, such a
jurisdictional debate is the very topic of this article.
In 1935, 28 U.S.C. § 41(19) stated, “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction . . . [o]f all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”210 When § 41
was broken out into subparts in 1948, § 41(19) became § 1334
and
the
“phraseology” was modified to read, “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all matters and
proceedings in bankruptcy.”211
Section 1334 remained unchanged until 1978. The 1978 amendment arose
in the context of growing dissatisfaction with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
which was still in effect at the time, causing Congress to overhaul the entire
legislative scheme.212 Among the problems with the Bankruptcy Act at the
time was the limited effectiveness of bankruptcy adjudication, which worked
as follows:
Before the [1978] Act, federal district courts served as bankruptcy
courts and employed a ‘referee’ system. Bankruptcy proceedings
were generally conducted before referees, except in those instances in
which the district court elected to withdraw a case from a referee.
The referee’s final order was appealable to the district court. The
understanding of its framers . . . . The new civil rights act reflects contemporary policy and politics, rather than
a dispute between Congress and the Supreme Court over the mechanics of interpretation.”).
207 Applying the statute in this way may violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See
Silbowitz v. Sec’y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862, 867 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff’d sub nom. Califano
v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924 (1977).
208 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 379, § 205(h), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371.
209 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV.
47, 62 (1997); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982).
210 28 U.S.C. § 41(19) (1934).
211 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. II 1948).
212 See Posner, supra note 209, at 61.
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bankruptcy courts were vested with ‘summary jurisdiction’—that is,
with jurisdiction over controversies involving property in the actual
or constructive possession of the court. And, with consent, the
bankruptcy court also had jurisdiction over some ‘plenary’ matters—
such as disputes involving property in the possession of a third
person.213

Under this regime, however, “bankruptcy judges did not have sufficient
jurisdictional and remedial powers to decide cases in an expeditious way—
they would have to refer issues outside their power to the supervising district
court—and that bankruptcy judges’ subordinate status weakened their
authority with litigants.”214
To remedy this defect, Congress created “in each judicial district, as an
adjunct to the district court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be
a court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
district.”215 Accompanying the creation of the courts was a broad jurisdictional
grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (which went into effect on April 1, 1984) that gave
the bankruptcy courts “exclusive jurisdiction” of a debtor’s bankruptcy case
and assets:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11
is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this
section on the district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district
court or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining
from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising
in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision
not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.

213
214
215

N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 53; Posner, supra note 209, at 62.
Posner, supra note 209, at 62; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 53.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 53 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (Supp. IV 1976)).
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(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever
located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.216

Correspondingly, § 1334 was changed to provide for the appeals process:
(a) The district courts for districts for which panels have not been
ordered appointed under section 160 of this title shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final judgments, orders, and decrees
of bankruptcy courts.
(b) The district courts for such districts shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from interlocutory orders and decrees of bankruptcy courts,
but only by leave of the district court to which the appeal is taken.
(c) A district court may not refer an appeal under that section to a
magistrate or to a special master.217

Shortly after the enactment of the 1978 Act, in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,218 the Supreme Court held that the authority of
the bankruptcy courts violated Article III of the United States Constitution
because it “gave Article III powers to judges who do not have lifetime tenure
and independent salaries.”219
Congress fixed the statute in 1984, and amended the unconstitutional
elements of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional grant in § 1334 as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive Jurisdiction of all cases
under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest
of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for

216

28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1978) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1978) (changing § 1334’s heading from “Bankruptcy matters and
proceedings” to “Bankruptcy appeals”).
218 458 U.S. at 73.
219 Posner, supra note 209, at 93; see N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 73 (holding that the authority
granted to bankruptcy courts violated Article III of the Constitution).
217
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State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State
law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11
but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with
respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court
of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district
court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is
commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of
appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under this
subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. This subsection
shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided
for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section
applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or
is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case,
and of the estate.220

Notably, Congress removed the provision providing bankruptcy courts with
“all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.”221
Given the substantial amount of effort and energy that went into
overhauling the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and 1984—again, an overhaul
geared towards solving this very jurisdictional debate—it is implausible that
Congress intended to deprive the bankruptcy courts of “exclusive jurisdiction”
over the debtor and its estate when the debtor was a hospital that sought to
challenge a Medicare payment decision. This would lead to the absurd result
that the Bankruptcy Code’s protections do not apply to a small but not
insignificant part of the population of debtors (insolvent hospitals relying on
Medicare payments) due to an inferred deference to Medicare’s administrative
expertise. If Congress preferred the development of administrative expertise to
judicial efficiency in bankruptcy proceedings, it would have expressly
excluded bankruptcy jurisdiction from every type of administrative proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Code. But it did not. Instead, by providing “an independent
basis for bankruptcy court jurisdiction,” Congress made clear that in the

220
221

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1984) (emphasis added).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. IV 1978), with 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1984).
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Medicare Act and elsewhere, “exhaustion of administrative remedies pursuant
to other jurisdictional statutes is not required.”222
4. Section 2663 Contains Numerous Sections that Change Parties’ Rights
If § 2663 of the DRA is interpreted to have made no changes to a party’s
rights, many of its provisions lead to absurd results. And this, combined with
the clarity of the Bankruptcy Code, makes it more likely that the actual
scrivener’s error is the broad statement in § 2664(b) that none of the hundreds
of changes in § 2663(a) alter a party’s rights.
The court in Nurses’ Registry highlights four such absurdities:
•

A change in § 2663 to 42 U.S.C. § 1307 added to the law
making it a crime to impersonate a “former wife divorced” to
obtain information about a Social Security beneficiary’s
benefits provisions for husbands, mothers, and fathers; no
change in rights under § 2664(b) would mean that § 1307 still
only made it a crime to impersonate a “former wife
divorced.”223

•

“Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 422(b)(4), since repealed,
which mandated deductions from Social Security benefits on
account of refusal to accept rehabilitation services, to not
apply to ‘full-time elementary or secondary school students’
between the ages of eighteen to twenty-two, whereas
§ 422(b)(4) previously carved out all ‘full-time students’ of
the same ages. If Defendants were right about the
ineffectiveness of the DRA’s technical amendments, college
students between the ages of eighteen to twenty-two would
have continued to be exempt from § 422(b)(4) until its repeal
in 1999.”224

•

“[M]ost remarkably, a ‘technical amendment’ in the DRA
repealed an entire title of the SSA, Title XIII, which provided
a program of unemployment benefits for federal seamen. If
the DRA’s technical amendments truly did not ‘change or

222 In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation
marks omitted).
223 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 596 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015).
224 Id.
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affect any right,’ the Reconversion Unemployment Benefits
for Seamen program is still federal law.”225
•

Regarding the Medicare Act, “At least one of the DRA’s
sixty-five ‘technical amendments’ to the Medicare Act, while
minor, is likewise unmistakably substantive. This amendment
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1395y’s exclusion of certain benefits
during the period from when an individual becomes eligible
under Medicare to ‘the month in which such individual attains
the age of 70,’ to an exclusion of benefits during the period
from eligibility to ‘the month before the month in which such
individual attains the age of 70.’ In other words, this
‘technical amendment,’ which Congress claimed did not
‘affect any right,’ abbreviated a benefits exclusion by a
month.”226

Therefore, if § 2663 made no changes to parties’ rights, then many of its
textual changes make no sense. However, § 2664(b)
has
been
plainly
misapplied and misinterpreted because courts have wholly ignored its key
qualifier: language limiting the time period of its efficacy.
5. “Before That Date” Language
Section 2664(b) of the “technical” amendments in the DRA states that, “but
none of such amendments shall be construed as changing or affecting any
right, liability, status, or interpretation which existed (under the provisions of
law involved) before that date.”227 However, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1984, which granted bankruptcy courts broad jurisdictional authority over a
debtor’s estate, was passed eight days before the DRA. As such, § 2664(b)
actually preserves the jurisdictional rights granted to bankruptcy courts as they
existed before the passage of the DRA, which would be based on the

225 Id. It bears noting that Title XIII’s effective period expired on June 30, 1950. Olga S. Halsey,
Reconversion Unemployment Benefits for Seamen, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN (Aug. 1949), https://www.
ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v12n8/v12n8p15.pdf. But even reading this example out of the Nurses’ Registry
court’s reasoning does not alter the overall conclusion that § 2663 does, in fact, alter rights. Nor does § 2663’s
title, “OTHER TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND RELATED
PROVISIONS” and its location in “Subtitle D—Technical Corrections” change this outcome because where,
as is the case with § 405(h), there is no ambiguity in the statutory language the “title of a statute . . . cannot
limit the plain meaning of [its] text.” Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998).
226 Nurses’ Registry, 533 B.R. at 596 n.11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A)(iii) (1982) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1985)).
227 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162 (1984) (emphasis added).
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Bankruptcy Reform Act. Section 2664(b)’s plain language228 therefore requires
§ 1334 to be read out of § 405(h) because § 1334 was passed eight days earlier
and grants significant procedural and substantive rights to bankruptcy courts
over the debtor’s estate.229 Indeed, it is implausible that Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Code and its jurisdictional grant and then, just over a week later,
abrogated parts of it in the Medicare Act without any explicit intent to do so.
6. Courts Lack Power to Correct Technical Errors
Finally, § 405(h) must be enforced as written even if its omission of § 1334
is a technical error because courts cannot correct technical errors.230 If
Congress enacts something it did not intend to, the solution is for Congress to
pass another law amending it.231 Indeed, “courts only correct drafting errors
where they are certain, usually for reasons of absurdity, that an error occurred,
and where the error is a ‘technical mistake in transcribing’ a law rather than a
from
‘substantive mistake in designing’ a law.”232 If the omission of § 1334
§ 405(h) was a technical error, as the “legislative history” argument requires, it
must nevertheless be enforced as written until Congress amends or rewrites it.
CONCLUSION
Despite the compelling nature of the plain language argument, whether a
bankruptcy court jurisdictional grant supersedes Medicare’s is an issue that has
resulted in many contrary decisions over more than two decades. Still, the
recent decisions in Nurses’ Registry and Bayou Shores remind bankruptcy
attorneys and financial advisors that the bankruptcy court may offer relief to a
distressed hospital by avoiding spending years wandering the desert that is the
228 Assuming § 405(h)’s jurisdictional grant is substantive and not procedural. See supra at note 193; In re
Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 472–73 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL
35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999).
229 The “under the provisions of law involved” parenthetical includes § 405(h) and § 1334.
230 Even if § 2664(b) and its apparently broad application is a scrivener’s error that a court cannot correct,
enforcing it as written does not change the present analysis due to its qualifying time limitation language
discussed above.
231 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law something different
from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent. ‘It is beyond our province to
rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.’
This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and respective, constitutional roles. In the
meantime, we must determine intent from the statute before us.” (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511
U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
232 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015) (quoting
King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2505 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Medicare appeals process and instead having its life-threatening disputes
handled quickly and efficiently by a federal bankruptcy court.

